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1. Abstract 
Cloning spare parts and entities of mass products is an old and serious unsolved problem 
for automotive industry. The economic losses in addition to loss of know-how and IP theft as 
well as security and safety threats are huge in all dimensions. This presentation gives an 
overview on the traditional state of the art on producing clone-resistant electronic units in the 
last two decades. A survey is attempting to demonstrate the techniques so far known as 
Physically Unclonable Functions PUFs showing their advantages and drawbacks.  
The necessity for fabricating “mechatronic-security” in vehicular environment is emerging to 
become a vital requirement for new automotive security regulations (legal regulations) in the 
near future. Automotive industry is facing a challenge to produce low-cost and highly safe and 
secure networked automotive systems. The emerging networked smart traffic environment is 
offering new safety services and creating at the same time new needs and threats in a highly 
networked world. There is a crying need for automotive security that approaches the level of 
the robust “biological security” for cars as dominating mobility actors in the modern smart life 
environment.  
Possible emerging technologies allowing embedding practical mechatronic-security modules 
as low-cost digital alternative are presented. Such digital clone-resistant mechatronic-units (as 
Electronic Control Units ECUs) may serve as smart security anchors for automotive 
environment in the near future. First promising initial results are also presented. 
 
2. Introduction 
The Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were introduced two decades ago for 
fabricating electronic unclonable units for secured identification or for intellectual property 
protection [1] to [31]. Due to the analog nature of all proposed PUF technologies, virtually all 
techniques proposed so far had limited use in real world applications due to economic cost 
factors and failing long term stability. The majority of such PUF techniques offer idealized DNA-
like identity for a physical entity. However, all such technologies suffer from being highly 
inconsistent due to being sensitive to aging, temperature, power fluctuations and other 
operational conditions. The objectives of this presentation are to show the different known 
traditional unclonability technologies and their drawbacks for vehicular industry.  
A secured “Mechatronic-Identity” is one of the most wanted requirements in automotive 
systems for producing unclonable or clone resistant units and spare parts. This technology 
seems to be in its childhood due to the expected high cost factors when embedded in vehicular 
units like Electronic Control Units (ECU) and seriously more problematic in mass-products as 
automotive wearing-parts. In the contemporary emerging world of Internet of Things (IoT), 
automotive units are becoming even a part of the worldwide communicating networked units. 
This requires however robust, consistent and low-cost technologies for safe and secure 
operation. This is admittedly a very challenging research and development area addressing 
the “Physical Security” issues which started recently to grow up exponentially in its importance 
in the research environment. Unclonable uniqueness is expected to play a major role as a 
security anchor in all our future applications; similarly as it is the case in our well established 
smart biological environment. Technology will possibly not attain the quality of biological DNA-
identity. Modern technology can however, try to develop bio-inspired techniques.  
The following sections include first an excursion in the world of PUF technologies followed 
by introduction to some basic concepts of mechatronic-security. Finally a summary of some 
research activities on “Mechatronic-Security” and “practical Digital-PUFs” at IDA, Institut für 
Datentechnik und Kommunikationsnetze of the Technical Universität Braunschweig are 
presented. This is an attempt to initiate hopefully fruitful discussions and mutual exchange of 
ideas and experiences between industrial and academic communities. 
3. Basic Unclonability Concepts and Physically Unclonable Functions PUFs 
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a function embodied in a physical unique structure 
where its output looks like a random function, it is easy to evaluate but hard to predict even for 
an attacker with physical access. PUFs are increasingly used in cryptographic systems 
especially for devices identification/authentication, secure memoryless key storage, IP 
protection and anti-counterfeiting. As unclonable entities, PUFs should fulfil the following 
security requirements: 
Evaluable: For a given PUF, it should be easy to get a response R for any challenge C, 
R=PUF(C). The C-R pair is called a challenge-response pair CRP. 
Uniqueness:  PUFs should be unique, such that when challenging different PUFs with the 
same challenge C, each PUF generates a unique response which is also different from all 
other units. Fig. 1 illustrates this property. 
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Fig. 1. PUFs uniqueness property 
Robustness: Means that the PUF should generate consistent and repeatable responses 
within the whole system lifetime. Deviating responses should be impossible or tolerable by 
some adequate means. 
Unclonability: It should be intractable for an adversary (including the manufacturer) even 
when physically attacked to create a physical or software clone of the PUF. 
Unpredictability: The adversary should not efficiently be able to compute the response of a 
PUF to any challenge, even if he/she can adaptively obtain unlimited number of CRPs from 
the same PUF or other instances. 
One-way: PUFs are difficult to invert such that given a PUF and one of its responses R, it is 
hardly infeasible to find the corresponding challenge C. 
Tamper evident: The PUF should be tamper-evident. That is by any attempt to physically 
access the PUF, the PUF would changes its challenge/response behavior.  
4. PUF instantiations 
The idea of using the physical unique structure to identify units is similar to fingerprint 
identification of human beings. In the twentieth century, non-electronic PUFs have been 
introduced; they were using random patterns on paper and optical entities to extract unique 
identities. Recently, many electronic technologies for PUFs instantiations have been proposed, 
Fig. 2 shows a classification table for the most known PUFs instantiations. 
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Fig. 2. Physical Unclonable Functions instantiations 
 
3.1. Electronic PUFs 
3.1.1. VT PUF 
VT PUF was introduced in [1] , it consists of an addressable array of equally designed 
transistors driving resistive loads. The randomness is coming from the variations of the 
threshold voltage (VT) of each transistor, the addressed transistor drives a resistive load, and 
the resulting random analog voltage sequence is converted to a binary identification sequence. 
3.1.2. Power Dissipation PUF 
Power Dissipation PUF was introduced in [2], it is based on the resistance variation of the 
power grid of chips which is connected to Power Ports (PP). The response consists of a set of 
voltage drops at a set of distinct locations. The measured electrical parameters are random 
and unique. Fig. 3 describes a sample instrumentation setup of Power Dissipation PUF for 6 
PPs.. 
 Fig. 3. Instrumentation setup of Power Dissipation PUF [2] 
3.1.3. Coating PUF 
Coating PUF was introduced in [3].  A network of metal wires (sensors) is laid out in a comb 
shape. The space between and above is filled with opaque material and randomly doped with 
dielectric particles. The unpredictable capacitance values are measured with comb-shaped 
sensors on the top metal layer of an integrated circuit. 
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Fig. 4. Dielectric Coating PUF 
3.1.4. LC PUF 
LC PUF was introduced in [4]. A passive resonator circuit (LC circuit) absorbs an amount 
of power when a RF electromagnetic field is generated. The power depends on the frequency 
and of the precise characteristics of the capacity and inductance of the LC circuit that uniquely 
identifies an LC circuit. 
3.2. Non-Electronic PUFs 
3.2.1. Optical PUF 
Optical PUFs have been proposed first in [5], where reflective particle tags were developed 
for uniquely identifying strategic weapons. In [6], optical PUFs were proposed as Physical One-
Way Functions (POWF). The concept of optical PUF is presented in Fig. 5. A Laser beam is 
directed to a light scattering material. Random and unique speckle pattern will arise, the pattern 
is captured by a camera for digital processing to generate a unique identity. To increase the 
number of CRPs, different laser orientations can be used. 
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Fig. 5. Concept of Optical PUF 
 
3.2.2. Paper PUF 
Paper PUF was proposed in [7], It consists of scanning the unique and random fiber 
structure of regular or modified paper, the reflection of a laser beam on the random fiber 
structure is used as a fingerprint. 
3.2.3. CD PUF 
The data is stored as a series of lands and pits formed on the surface of the CD. It was 
observed that the measured lengths of lands and pits of a regular CD contain unpredictable 
random deviations which can be used as an identification profile [8]. 
3.2.4. RF DNA 
In one implementation scenario, a physical token as a mixture of conducting and dielectric 
materials integrated with an RFID is produced. A high frequency wave (5-6 GHz) is propagated 
through the token. A low-cost antenna matrix receives a fingerprint of the token and use it as 
an identification profile [9].  
3.2.5. Magnetic PUF 
Magnetic PUF is based on determining the remanent noise in a magnetic medium by DC 
(Direct Current) saturation of a region thereof and measurement of the remaining DC 
magnetization. The remanent noise may then be digitized and recorded on the same magnetic 
medium to thereby "fingerprint" the magnetic medium [10].  
3.2.6. Acoustical PUF 
Acoustical PUF presented in [11], is based on the random delay in a fiber-glass delay line 
integrated in a device (DL701) used in televisions. When probing DL701 with one certain 
caustic wave, the internal medium of DL701 changes the wave response characteristics 
individually. In [11], it is shown that each individual DL701 produces a unique response. To 
create large number of CRPs, each unit is probed with different frequencies. Fig.  6 describes 
the principle of the acoustic delay line PUF concept of DL701. 
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Fig.  6. Principle of DL701 Acoustic PUF 
3.3. Delay-Based Intrinsic PUFs 
3.3.1. Arbiter PUF 
The initial proposal of Arbiter PUF was introduced in [12][13], it is based on the random 
delay or latency of each switch block, such that for two symmetrically designed units, and 
because of the manufacturing variations, there is a small random offset delay between the 
delays of the two units. For n switch blocks, there exist 2n different delays selections as a 
stimulus. Fig. 7 illustrates the principle of an arbiter PUF. 
 
Fig. 7. Basic concept of arbiter PUF [14] 
3.3.2. Ring Oscillator  RO PUF  
RO PUF is also based on random delays caused by manufacturing variations. It is based 
on a delay line where its output is inverted and fed backed to its input, resulting with an 
asynchronously oscillating loop. The PUF response is extracted by measuring the frequency 
of the RO, where a simple edge detector can detects the rising edges in the periodical 
oscillation and a counter counts the number of edges over a period of time [15]. Ring Oscillator 
structure is also practically deployed in Microsemi S devices as a true random entropy source 
for the Number Random Bit Generator (NRBG), it provides 384 full entropy conditioned bits to 
the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) [16].  
3.3.3. Arbiter-Based PUF  
APUF was introduced in [17] to enhance the reliability of delay-based PUFs against 
temperature variations. APUF compensates the thermal-induced delay variation in the PUF 
circuits; a Voltage Controlled Current Starved (VCCS) inverter chain is regulated by adapting 
its control voltage by a complementary to absolute temperature (CTAT) reference generator. 
 
Fig. 8. Block diagram of APUF [17] 
3.3.4. Loop PUF 
Loop PUF was introduced in [18], it has nearly the same principle as the RO PUF. N 
identical and controllable delay chains are connected in a loop to create a ring oscillator, each 
delay chain contains M delay elements as shown in Fig. 9. The controller applies different 
combinations of the M control bits and measures the frequency or the delay of the oscillating 
loop. 
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Fig. 9. Loop PUF structure 
 
3.3.5. Sensitized Path PUF 
SP-PUF was introduced recently in [19], an existing circuit is turned into an SP-PUF. It is 
measuring the delay differences in selected delay paths in existing designs by adding Race-
Resolution Element (RRE) and multiplexers MuxA and MuxB as described in Fig. 10 [19]. 
 
Fig. 10. Example of SP-PUF [19] 
 
3.4. Memory based intrinsic PUFs 
3.4.1. SRAM PUF 
SRAM PUFs is one of the most practically used PUFs. was introduced in [20], this research 
was carried out at Phillips Research, before the company Intrinsic ID was founded. Intrinsic ID 
[21] created SRAM PUF, based on the behavior of standard SRAM memory in digital chips. It 
can differentiate devices such as microcontrollers from each other. Every SRAM cell has its 
own preferred state every time the SRAM is powered on, resulting from random differences in 
the threshold voltages. This randomness is expressed in the startup values of “uninitialized” 
SRAM memory. Hence an SRAM response yields a unique and random pattern of 0’s and 1’s. 
This pattern can represent a chip’s fingerprint, since it is unique for a particular SRAM and 
hence for a particular chip. In [14], security analysis of the most popular intrinsic electronic 
PUFs have been done, resulting that SRAM PUFs have a Bit Error Rates (BER) of about 6% 
at +25 °C, 8% at -40°C and at +85°C. Also, the BER at 1.20V is about 6% also for 1.32V. 
SRAM PUFs are used in some Microsemi FPGAs such as SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGAs [16] 
and IGLOO2 [22] FPGAs that can be used for providing secure memoryless keys for 
cryptographic applications (PUF unit complexity is around 100 K-Gate Equivalent!). SRAM 
PUF needs its own protected design area/location and can’t use the internal FPGA SRAM 
resources, as usable SRAMs are hard-resetted to all-zero after power up and hence its 
randomness is lost. Furthermore, SRAM PUF needs controllable power-up-event to enable the 
response generation which is not acceptable for all applications. 
 
3.4.2. Butterfly PUF 
Since SRAM PUFs can’t be used in FPGA environment without additional external 
resources, butterfly PUF was introduced in [23] to overcome the SRAM PUF drawbacks. It 
imitates the SRAM PUF in FPGA environment without the need for actual device power up, it 
consists of two cross-coupling latches. By using clear/preset functionality, a random state will 
be generated depending on the physical mismatch between the latches and the cross-coupling 
interconnect. 
3.4.3. Latch PUF 
Latch PUF [24] is very similar to Butterfly PUF, two NOR gates are cross-coupled to a simple 
NOR latch. Depending on the internal mismatch, it converges to a stable state. 
3.4.4. Flip-Flop PUF 
Flip-Flop PUF was proposed in [25], it is based on power up characteristics of uninitialized 
flip-flops. Flip-flops have the advantage of being able to easily spread over an IC which makes 
them difficult to locate by an attacker. 
3.4.5. Memristor PUF 
Memristor PUF was introduced in [26], memristors are emerging as next generation non-
volatile memory technologies, a memristor is defined at logic 0 when 0 < w/D < OL and for logic 
1 when OH < w/D < 1, the region 0 < w/D < OL is undefined. Fig. 11 presents the memristor 
device model. 
 
Fig. 11. Memristor device model [26] 
The memristor PUF mechanism exploits the unpredictable state of the memristor within the 
undefined region, where the state depends on the duration of access time to the memristor 
and the value of supply voltage. Each physical memristor unit behaves individually differently 
to the same challenge that can be a Short Write Time (SWT) or Low Write Voltage (LWV). 
3.4.6. Buskeeper PUF 
Buskeeper PUF was proposed in [27], Buskeeper or Busholder is a week latch that usually 
has no control signals. It is intended to be used with on-chip buses that have multiple drivers, 
it is equivalent to a DFF with the enable signal connected to Vdd [27], also it has lower 
hardware complexity than Latches and DFFs. The principle of Buskeeper PUF is similar to all 
memory based intrinsic PUFs where the initial patterns are read at the memory start up. 
 
Fig. 12. Buskeeper cell structure [27] 
5. Fuzzy extractors 
PUFs are inconsistent in their behavior because of their sensibility to the environmental 
conditions variations such as temperature, voltage variations, radiation deviations and aging 
factors. To overcome the PUFs inconsistency, Fuzzy Extractors or helper data algorithms are 
used to extract consistent responses from the PUFs. Fuzzy Extractors are designed to correct 
25% of inconsistency errors or more. Fuzzy extractors induce however new security weakness 
that will be discussed in the following section. Fig. 13 describes the general constellation 
strategy of PUFs with fuzzy extractors. 
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Fig. 13. Use of Fuzzy Extractor with PUFs 
 
6. Cloning Attacks on Physically Unclonable Functions 
Two types of cloning are well known: first; Mathematical/modelling cloning that aims to 
create an algorithm that behaves similarly as the targeted PUF. Second; A Physical cloning 
characterizes the physical response of the targeted device and creates an identical physical 
response in a second instance of the same device type.  
The process of cloning a PUF consists of two steps [28]:  
 Characterization: a process in which the attacker gains knowledge of the 
challenge/response behavior of a PUF. 
 Emulation: the process of recreating or modelling the unique response of a PUF, 
i.e. creating a PUF with identical challenge/response pairs. 
In [29][30], authors present successful modelling attacks on several known strong PUFs, 
including Arbiter PUFs, XOR arbiter PUFs, Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure 
PUFs, and Ring Oscillator PUFs. 
In [31], side-channel leakage attacks on PUFs and Fuzzy Extractors were analyzed. Attacks 
targeting weak PUFs and their fuzzy extractors were introduced. The presented analysis 
covers Arbiter PUFs and RO PUFs, by deploying side-channels mainly power consumption 
and electromagnetic emission. For fuzzy extractors, Simple Power Analysis (SPA) was used 
to attack both Code-Offset fuzzy extractor and Toeplitz hashing; hence extracting the 
cryptographic key derived from PUFs structure was possible. 
In [28], cloning SRAM PUF by side channel analysis was treated. As SRAM PUFs use standard 
on-chip memory interfaces and buses, attacker can gain control of such interfaces, where 
he/she could read the memory content and hence clones the SRAM PUF. Invasive de-
capsulation with micro-probing can provide access to any memory content, mostly if the 
memory IC is separated. For SRAM PUFs embedded in FPGA for example, this method is 
infeasible because of the huge number of interconnections. Several Side Channel Analysis 
(SCA) techniques can be used to extract the memory content or part of it, if the targeted device 
includes an inspection resistant memory. In [28], Photonic Emission Analysis (PEF) was used 
to extract the full content of an SRAM embedded in Atmel ATmega328P. PEF is passive, non-
destructive and a semi-invasive SCA. The proposed attack uses a backside approach to clone 
the SRAM startup behavior exploiting the most known countermeasures seeking to detect 
malicious modifications from the chips front sides. The amount of lab time necessary to 
produce an initial clone was about twenty hours, and subsequent clones was produced more 
easily in less than three hours [28].  
 
7. Mechatronic Security 
7.1. Optimized Secured Mechatronic Identity Model 
Linking electronic units to mechanical units such as sensors or actuators, results with joint 
entities assigned as mechatronic units. The security of such entities starts by securely 
identifying such units as unique entities. Therefore, a secured mechatronic identity is a first 
step towards cloning protection in automotive environment. Fig. 14 shows a possible joint 
structural mechatronic identity.  One ultimate implementation is by embedding the electronic 
unit in the physical structure when possible. The system includes now two identities joined 
together, namely the electronic one and the identity extracted from the body of the physical 
structure (physical structure-DNA itself). In that case the resulting unit becomes unclonable as 
any invasive physical attack on the electronic unit would destruct the identity profile and hence 
destructs the secret to be cloned in the physical body.   
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Fig. 14. Conceptual Mechatronic Security 
7.2. Sample Implementation Scenario for a Mechatronic Identity 
   One possible DNA like identity profile is the amorphous material structure of a physical body. 
Such structures exhibit properties which are impossible to predict, copy or to model.  These 
can be adequate structural properties to be used as a part of a DNA-like identity chain. 
To extract randomly a part of the internal structure, many mapping stimulation can help to get 
responses to some randomly selected stimulus from a huge stimulus class. If the number of 
stimulus possibilities exceeds say 280, then the trace of that structure is deemed as impossible 
to clone.  
Possible stimulus technologies on physical structure can be such as (but not limited to):  
Optical, acoustic, electrical, chemical, etc. which can be used jointly or individually as a 
Structure-DNA. 
Fig.  15 shows a possible sample conceptual DNA-like profile extraction constellation by using 
ultrasonic stimulation wave. The wireless link to the electronic control unit ECU is selected just 
to offer optimized security level against invasive attacks. The reason is that, any attempt to 
mechanically reach the ECU would destruct the secret structural response and hence destruct 
the DNA-like response and finally destruct the identity. That is, cloning becomes impossible by 
any invasive attack! 
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Fig.  15. Conceptual Identity Profile Extraction by Acoustic Waves 
Fig. 16 shows a possible stimulation train scenario for the constellation of Fig.  15. The first 
attained challenge –response pair show very promising results for a DNA-like chain with very 
good cryptographic entropy exceeding 200 bits.  
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Fig. 16. Sample Acoustic Wave Stimulation Sequence  
When taking into consideration the cancellation of the aging, temperature and other operation 
condition factors, the entropy may get down tremendously. However, even a low entropy of 
say 40 bits would still offer acceptable mechatronic security.  The reason is that the total 
identification entropy is the sum of both the structural and the ECU identification entropies. The 
digital ECU entropy is however highly scalable as would be seen in Section 6. 
Fig. 17 shows a first experimental acoustic wave based identification response in two equally 
fabricated “Eyton” blocks stimulated at a speed of about 40 KHz ultrasonic stimulation impulse. 
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Fig. 17. Experimental Identification Response Differences after DFT Mapping 
8. Proposed ECU Embedded Digital PUF Concept: 
8.1. Secret Unknown Cipher 
A new digital PUF concept was developed at IDA, Technische Universität Braunschwig 
since 2008. The main idea behind the concept is to replace the traditional analog PUF 
technologies mentioned in section 4 by digital PUFs. 
The key technique of the proposed digital-PUFs is to create own digital PUF within existing 
ECUs. The result is a usable and practically implementable security however theoretically not 
perfect as the analog PUF. 
The proposed digital PUF technique is only possible if a self-reconfiguring nonvolatile hard and 
software technology as an ECU is used. Such technology is expected to be available in the 
near future. 
Fig. 18 shows the digital PUF creation or “Mutation” concept as a Secret Unknown Cipher 
SUC. Notice that the security of the system is not equivalent to “security by obscurity”!!. The 
reason is that the created/mutated cipher is a random-unknown-cipher and is not known to 
anybody. The only secret which can be kept absolutely secure is the one which nobody knows. 
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Fig. 18. The Secret Unknown Cipher (SUC) Principle  
Fig. 19 shows a practical scenario for creating a SUC by a non-predictable and non-repeatable 
single-event personalization process in a post-fabrication operation. 
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Fig. 19. Embedding Secret Unknown Cipher (SUC) Principle as a Digital PUF in ECU 
 
Fig. 20 shows the personalization and identification protocol of the created individual SUC in 
a certain ECU. 
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Fig. 20. Key Idea of SUCs in an ECU and a Primitive C-R identification Protocol 
 
8.2. Sample Digital PUF Prototype as a SUC 
Fig.  21 shows one sample layout implementation of a SUC having an entropy of 80 bits  in 
a non-volatile Microsemi FPGA SoC technology.   
The layout shows a very low complexity.  In other words, if an ECU using such SoC FPGA 
(Cost ca. 1 to 3 $), then embedding a secured digital identity in the ECU unit may cost nothing 
other than a personalization process running for few milliseconds. 
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Fig.  21. Sample SUC implementation in a Microsemi SoC FPGA 
 
The accommodated SUC identity has a hardware complexity of just 213 LUTs and 72 register 
bits. Fig. 21 shows different chip selection scenarios consuming at most 4,5% of the 
programmable hardware resources of the chip area.   
The following figure presents the hardware complexity of SUC (in percent) for different 
SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGAs Families  
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M2S150 0,14 0,04
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Fig. 22. SUC implementation Complexity in a Microsemi SoC FPGA 
Fig. 23 shows a possible practical realization scenario for low-cost clone-resistant automotive 
units. 
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Fig. 23. Low-Cost Secured Automotive Mechatronic Unit 
9. Conclusion 
The emerging vehicular security requirements would require in the foreseen future that each 
vehicular unit is expected to fulfill the following security requirements: 
- Each Car should accommodate unique, unclonable and remotely provable secured 
Identity 
- The car manufacturer should not be able to create the same identity (that is, equivalent 
to the biological identity) 
- The identity technology should be robust and stable for at least 25 years 
- Some ECUs should be clone-resistant or unclonable 
 
The required technology is still highly challenging in the contemporary technologies. 
Mechatronic security (Physical Security) is going to play a fundamental role as a 
security anchor in all future vehicular systems as DNA in the very robust and reliable 
natural biological systems. 
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